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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## THE WEEK IN BRIEF

## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## DISMISSALS OF SATELLITE LEADERS . . . . . Page 1

Within the past three weeks, high-level officials have been demoted or dismissed from their party and government posts in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania, probably as a result of developments at the Soviet 20th Party Congress. In most cases, these changes have involved persons closely associated with the injustices and excesses of the Stalinist era. These developments have encouraged dissident elements within the parties to press their demands more vigorously and to bring party factionalism out into the open. [REDACTED]

## MOLLET-PINEAU VISIT TO MOSCOW . . . . . Page 4

Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau seem to regard their visit to Moscow, beginning on 15 May, as an opportunity to sound out "the real intentions of Russia" on relaxing East-West tensions and to demonstrate to French and international opinion their own desire for a detente. The Soviet leaders appear to be looking forward to the visit as a further opportunity to encourage what they believe to be growing signs of French independence within the Western alliance. Neither the French nor the Soviet leaders seem, however, to expect concrete developments on important issues. [REDACTED]

## ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . Page 5

Events since UN secretary general Hammarskjold's mission to the Near East indicate that his activities resulted in only a temporary truce as far as the Arabs and Israelis are concerned. The secretary general gained time for further diplomatic maneuvering, and his activities, combined with the Soviet foreign policy statement of 17 April, may lead the Arabs and Israelis to make more cautious assessments of their positions. [REDACTED]

## THE CYPRUS CRISIS . . . . . Page 6

The execution on 10 May of two Greek Cypriot terrorists has precipitated a new crisis between Greece and Britain. Karamanlis, in an effort to forestall opposition attacks, may break relations with Britain, but this may not be sufficient to keep his government in power. [REDACTED]

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## PART II

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

PAKISTAN . . . . . Page 1

Pakistani prime minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's two-week trip to Communist China, scheduled to begin on 15 May, will coincide with a period of intense political activity at home which may determine his political future. Opposition Awami League leader H.S. Suhrawardy, who may replace Chaudhri as prime minister, would not alter basically Pakistan's present ties with the West; but both President Mirza and the West would probably find Suhrawardy more independent than the prime ministers they have had to deal with in the past. [REDACTED]

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SOUTH KOREAN ELECTION . . . . . Page 3

The death of South Korean Democratic presidential candidate Sin Ik-hui has removed President Rhee's most outspoken critic and has forced the opposition to concentrate its efforts almost entirely on the vice-presidential race in the 15 May election. Most observers see this as a close contest, with Rhee's Liberal Party using police suppression methods in order to gain majorities in the rural areas sufficient to overcome opposition strength in the cities. [REDACTED]

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NORTH AFRICA . . . . . Page 3

The Tunisian and Moroccan governments have intensified their campaign for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with other countries. While France maintains it has sole responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of these North African states, pending parliamentary approval of a transfer, Paris may be modifying its position somewhat with regard to Morocco; the French remain adamant in the case of Tunisia. France and Spain, meanwhile, are vying with each other to champion the return to Morocco of the internationalized city of Tangier. [REDACTED]

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TITO'S VISIT TO FRANCE . . . . . Page 4

Marshal Tito's five-day state visit to France, which began on 7 May, is part of Yugoslavia's campaign to strengthen its political and economic ties with the West as a balance to its growing relations with the Soviet bloc. Tito insisted that this trip precede his journey to Moscow, now scheduled for June. [REDACTED]

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SOVIET-DANISH TALKS . . . . . Page 5

In the course of the talks between Soviet and Danish leaders in Moscow in March, Khrushchev said that NATO, under American domination, was trying to strangle the Soviet Union but that NATO would soon collapse.

[REDACTED]

NATO "WISE MEN" APPOINTED . . . . . Page 6

The three foreign ministers assigned to study ways of improving nonmilitary co-operation within NATO and developing greater unity will canvass all NATO members for ideas and will meet in Paris in mid-June in preparation for a report by November.

[REDACTED]

POLISH OFFICIALS APOLOGIZE  
FOR LOW STANDARD OF LIVING . . . . . Page 7

Polish officials, on the defensive in the face of widespread criticism, have been unusually frank in trying to explain away the failure of their Six-Year Plan (1949-55) to raise the standard of living. The Poles attribute their difficulties to agricultural shortcomings and the great effort that has gone into increasing military power.

[REDACTED]

RAIL CONSTRUCTION ON AMOY ISLAND . . . . . Page 8

A high priority rail construction effort is under way on Amoy Island, suggesting that Peiping may intend to reopen that port late this year. Full use of the port would require neutralization of the Chinese Nationalist forces on nearby Quemoy Island.

[REDACTED]

CHINESE NATIONALISTS ATTEMPT  
TO HARASS SOVIET SHIPPING . . . . . Page 9

The Chinese Nationalists are attempting to harass Soviet shipping in the South China Sea area, where Soviet vessels have recently resumed voyages to North China and Soviet Far East ports.

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## RAPID PROGRESS

ON TRANS-SINKIANG RAILROAD . . . . . Page 11

China and the USSR have now set 1960 as the deadline for the opening of through service on the Trans-Sinkiang railway, providing the bloc with a transcontinental railway in addition to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The agreements reached when Mikoyan visited Peiping early in April establish the route through the difficult terrain along the Sino-Soviet border and call for Soviet participation in building the section between the border and Urumchi in Sinkiang. The new line may be completed as early as 1959. [REDACTED]

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VIET MINH PARTY CONFERENCE . . . . . Page 12

The ninth conference of the central committee of the Viet Minh Communists endorsed the Soviet 20th Party Congress position on collective leadership and renewed demands for the "peaceful" unification of the two Vietnams. On both questions, however, the party leaders apparently retain certain reservations: they continue their adulatory references to Ho Chi Minh and acknowledge the existence of some party sentiment in favor of unification through armed struggle. [REDACTED]

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COMMUNISTS INCREASE STRENGTH  
IN BURMESE ELECTIONS . . . . . Page 13

Premier Nu's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League has retained a substantial majority in the lower house of the Burmese parliament, but the Communist-led National United Front has nearly quadrupled its representation. The prospects are that the government will take steps to neutralize or to absorb the pro-Communist opposition.

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COMMUNISTS EMPHASIZE  
INTERNATIONAL YOUTH ACTIVITY . . . . . Page 14

International Communist youth fronts, taking their cue from the new co-operative tone of Soviet foreign policy, are trying to improve working relations with non-Communist groups. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) are seeking participation of non-Communist groups in festivals, conferences, tours, summer camps, and student exchanges. They are presently engaged in preparations for the Afro-Asian Students' Conference in Bandung late this month, and are already promoting the youth and student festival planned to bring 30,000 persons to Moscow in 1957.

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USSR PRODUCING  
SUBMINIATURE ELECTRONIC PARTS . . . . . Page 15

The Soviet electronics industry is now able to mass-produce subminiature tubes, and production of transistors may have passed the experimental stage. These subminiature electronic components are essential for proximity fuses, guided missiles, and modern air-borne electronic equipment.

INTEGRATION OF AGRICULTURAL  
PLANS IN USSR AND SATELLITES . . . . . Page 16

A series of Soviet and Satellite agricultural conferences have been held this year to improve the coordination of bloc plans for agriculture, the weakest aspect of the bloc economies. The USSR is beginning to push increased specialization in the output of crops and production of agricultural machinery.

ISSUE OF AUSTRIAN TERRITORIAL  
GUARANTEE MAY BE REVIVED . . . . . Page 17

Recent developments in Vienna and Moscow indicate that the question of a four-power guarantee of Austrian territorial integrity and inviolability may soon be raised in diplomatic channels. Vienna's attitude suggests the Austrians may not require Russian prodding and may bring up the matter on their own initiative.

FRANCO'S REACTION  
TO UNREST IN SPAIN . . . . . Page 18

Unrest among Spanish industrial workers continues. General Franco's recent speeches to the Falange suggest that he now feels on the defensive and is trying to counteract the increasing discontent within the country by playing off one faction against another.

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### PART III

#### PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

##### PROBLEM YOUTH IN THE SOVIET UNION . . . . . Page 1

The Communists for 30-odd years have striven to create a generation made up of the "new Soviet man"--wholeheartedly devoted to Communist morality and the party line, and indoctrinated in political and social conformity. The Soviet regime is still struggling, however, evidently in vain, to suppress juvenile crime and what amounts to a minor cultural rebellion against official norms of public conduct, work discipline and cultural tastes. Many Soviet youth--particularly the children of privileged parents, including the sons of Mikoyan and Kaganovich--are displaying what the Communists consider an indecent, almost subversive interest in lavish living, the conspicuous enjoyment of private property, idleness, Western dress, jazz and non-Communist literature. [REDACTED]

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##### WARSAW PACT DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 8

In the year since a unified command of the Soviet and European Satellite armed forces was established under the Warsaw pact, the groundwork has been laid for more complete integration of the Soviet bloc's military forces. The principal measures reported to have been effected thus far include the addition of East Germany to the combined command, commitments of some national forces to a pact defense force, joint training, and coordinated weapons production. While the principal value to Moscow of the pact remains political, further measures may be anticipated to make the combined command an effective combat force. [REDACTED]

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**SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SCANDINAVIA . . . . . Page 9**

The primary Soviet objective in Scandinavia since 1949 has been to weaken the ties of Norway, Denmark and Iceland to NATO. At the least, the USSR would like to eliminate the American base in Iceland and obtain firm commitments from Norway and Denmark that they will not permit foreign troops to be stationed on their territory in peacetime. It would also like to persuade these countries that world conditions now permit them to reduce their defense establishments, and gain Scandinavian support for the Soviet position on European security. Thus far, the Soviet tactics appear to have had little direct influence on the foreign and defense policies of the Scandinavian countries; in Iceland, however, they have indirectly affected public sentiment regarding the American base question.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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PART I  
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## DISMISSALS OF SATELLITE LEADERS

Within the past three weeks, high-level officials have been demoted or dismissed from their party and government posts in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania, probably as a result of developments at the Soviet 20th Party Congress. In most cases, these changes have involved persons closely associated with the injustices and excesses of the Stalinist era. These developments have encouraged dissident elements within the parties to press their demands more vigorously and to bring party factionalism out into the open.

By these dismissals the Satellite regimes probably intend to show that cognizance is being taken of the public criticism deliberately generated since the 20th Congress, as well as to demonstrate that those responsible for Stalinist crimes are being punished. It also appears that where strong party factionalism exists, as for example in Poland, the situation is being exploited by one faction to

eliminate key members of its opposition.

There have been no dismissals yet in Albania, East Germany, or Hungary, but in the latter two countries there is evidence of considerable dissidence and factionalism within the parties. East Germany's Ulbricht and Hungary's Rakosi apparently retain their positions only because of strong Soviet backing.

Poland

The shake-up has been most extensive in Poland, where a new party leadership headed by First Secretary Ochab is faced with extensive, and in some cases uncontrolled, public criticism and with a factional struggle within the party.

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In addition to earlier dismissals in response to demands for greater liberties



ULBRICHT



RAKOSI



OCHAB

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and freedom of expression, Jakub Berman, a close associate of Stalin and often described as the power behind the throne in Poland, was dismissed on 6 May from the politburo and his post as vice premier. The new first secretary, Ochab, thus eliminated a personal enemy as well as a recognized relic left over from the Stalin era.

Bulgaria

Premier Vulko Chervenkov, who was demoted to deputy premier on 17 April and replaced by his rival Anton Yugov, appears to have been jettisoned by the Bulgarian Communists because he was a symbol of Stalinism within Bulgaria and abroad, especially in Yugoslavia.

He did not lose his politburo post, however, and there have been no firm indications that more extensive shifts will be made.

Czechoslovakia

So far the Czech government has dropped only one

top-level official from his party and government posts, the highly unpopular Alexej Cepicka, minister of defense, deputy premier, and politburo member, who was ousted on 19 April. Public criticism of government policies similar to that which has reached serious proportions in Poland, has been rapidly developing since that date. Detailed press articles are appearing almost daily criticizing the conduct of the National Assembly and the regime's policies concerning literature, education, and moral training.

In the light of this increasing criticism, additional dismissals of important government officials appear likely. The position of the leading triumvirate of President Zapotocky, Premier Siroky, and party first secretary Novotny, however, does not appear threatened.

Rumania

In Rumania, two comparatively uninfluential officials, Deputy Premier Dumitru Petrescu



YUGOV



ZAPOTOCKY



GHEORGHIEU-DEJ

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and State Arbiter Victor Duza, were dismissed on 7 May. Dismissals in other Satellittes have generated rumors in Bucharest that party leader Gheorghiu-dej will lost his position, but these appear unfounded. Some other top Rumanian Communists, such as politburo member Chisinevski, may be sacrificed, however, in the present campaign to divorce the regime from its past harsh Stalinist practices.

Hungary

Although Hungarian party leader Rakosi's internal position has been weakened by the developments following the Soviet party congress, he apparently retains Moscow's support and may again be successful in weathering a severe political storm. The strong "rightist" opposition in the party to Rakosi's leadership has been emboldened by recent events in the bloc to attack Rakosi openly and demand his resignation.

Cognizant of Rakosi's problems, the USSR publicly endorsed his policies on 4 April and again on 2 May when Pravda published an editorial by him. The editorial called on Hungarian Communists to "support and preserve the authority of the party leadership" and for energetic efforts

to liquidate the dissemination of "rotten hostile views" in the party.

The USSR's reason for continuing to support Rakosi may be its fear that his removal at this time would be regarded in Hungary as symbolic of great changes to come and would stimulate undue unrest in the party and among the people.

East Germany

East German party first secretary Ulbricht's status as the Communist boss of East Germany is probably not as firm as his dominance of the recent third party conference would suggest. So much criticism of Ulbricht as a practitioner of one-man rule was voiced by party members that leading party officials were compelled to speak in his defense at the conference and subsequently.

Ulbricht maintains his position within the party against this animosity and latent opposition only because of the direct Soviet support he receives. The Kremlin is probably fearful of the unrest that would be stirred up in East Germany and the resulting weakening of its position if the East Germans were allowed the same freedoms as have been exercised by the Poles.

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## MOLLET-PINEAU VISIT TO MOSCOW

Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau seem to regard their impending visit to Moscow as an opportunity to sound out "the real intentions of Russia" on relaxing East-West tensions and to make clear to French and international opinion their own desire for a detente. Though apparently retaining some slight hope of finding the Soviet leaders receptive, they regard the visit as by no means crucial for their foreign policy. The USSR probably regards the visit as only another step in the long-run Soviet effort to weaken France as an effective partner in the Western defense system.

Mollet intends to arrive in Moscow by 15 May and remain for only four days of diplomatic talks, but Pineau plans to stay on for an additional five or six days to tour the country. According to the French ambassador in Moscow, no formal agenda has been set up, but the agreed topics for discussion cover most of the major international problems.

The Soviet leaders probably do not expect to win formal French support on important issues. Pineau has assured American officials that even if the French should find themselves in accord with the Soviet government on some important but controversial matter, they would not admit it to the Russians until the matter had been fully discussed with their allies.

Mollet and Pineau have long insisted that the West must publicize its case more effectively, and, in particular, make an effort to counter the Soviet

monopoly of the peace theme. This approach appears to meet the desires of most Frenchmen and is particularly attractive to the rank and file of Mollet's own Socialist Party.

Various commentators, however, tended to read into the French ministers' repeated insistence on disarmament a willingness to jettison German unification. Mollet and Pineau have vigorously rejected this interpretation, and reaffirmed their support of Atlantic solidarity.

The American embassy in Paris is uneasy over the assumption by many French Socialists that they, being Marxists, "understand" the Soviet system better than non-Marxists. The embassy notes a propensity among some French Socialists to believe that "fundamental" changes are taking place in the Soviet Union. Mollet himself maintains that it cannot be determined yet whether the new Soviet attitude means a profound political change or only a change of methods. The American embassy in Moscow has been reassured by the skeptical attitude maintained by the delegation of French Socialist deputies now touring the USSR.

Probable Topics of Talks

Disarmament, German unification, and European security will probably be the most important political topics at the talks. The USSR is likely to stress proposals for European security, based on a divided Germany, and for limitation and inspection of armaments in a central European zone rather than German unification with neutrality.

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Soviet leaders may hope to find some common ground in the disarmament picture, based on previous French expressions of willingness, since modified, to discuss disarmament before German unification. The USSR may believe that any new initiative on disarmament, such as the unilateral force reduction hinted at in Khrushchev's talk to a group of French "peace partisans" on 9 May, would have the greatest effect on French opinion. In view of the failure of the recent disarmament talks in London, the French probably do not expect favorable developments on disarmament at the Moscow talks.

Mollet and Pineau will probably want to sound out the USSR on the Near East, where a limited parallel between French and Soviet policy has already developed. Moscow's willingness to consider an arms embargo under UN auspices for that area was probably designed in part to meet long-standing French desires for an effective embargo. The USSR may press for joint statements along this line and a conference of the

interested countries on Near East problems.

Certain North African questions may be raised by Mollet and Pineau as a test of Soviet protestations of friendship for France. Mollet particularly wants a favorable Soviet attitude on France's Algerian policy. He also probably would like clarification on Soviet intentions to establish diplomatic relations with Morocco and Tunisia, sponsor them for UN membership, or provide them with economic aid.

The remaining topics agreed on for discussion include Indochina--on which France probably has nothing to propose--trade, and cultural relations. The French are interested in a general expansion of trade with the bloc and intend to make a strong effort for more exchanges in all cultural fields. The Soviet leaders may make large trade offers to France conditioned on the ending of strategic controls, and urge increased French Socialist contacts with the Communist Party of the USSR.

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## ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

Events since UN secretary general Hammarskjold's mission to the Near East indicate that his activities resulted in only a temporary truce as far as the Arabs and Israelis are concerned. Despite renewed promises of adherence by both sides to the seven-year-old general armistice agreement, incidents continue on the Arab-Israeli border. Pessimistic notes sounded by Arab and Israeli official sources have been echoed privately by

Hammarskjold himself, who told American representatives that he felt he had gained at best a two- to-six month truce.

None of the basic issues standing in the way of an Arab-Israeli settlement have been resolved. The Jordan River water problem still focuses on the possibility that Israel might resume work on the Banat Yacov diversion canal, and an Egyptian Foreign Ministry

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official has reiterated that Egypt will stand behind whatever action Syria may take in that event. The same official denied that the questions of Egypt's blockade of the Suez and Gulf of Aqaba were discussed with Hammarskjold, although the secretary general averred that he had thought he was close to a solution of that issue.

Far from expressing any appreciation for Hammarskjold's efforts or for the results of his mission, the press in most of the Arab states and Israel is taking the line that nothing has changed, and a Lebanese newspaper, quoted extensively by Cairo radio, bade him farewell with the hope that this representative of the "imperialists" would never return.

Nevertheless, as Hammarskjold said on his return to

New York, his mission did appear to have gained time during which further diplomatic maneuvering might achieve more solid results. The Arabs seem almost fearful that this might happen, since their propagandists have begun to warn against a possible revival of the Johnston plan for the Jordan water problem.

In addition, the secretary general's activities may have brought home to the area the thought that the Western powers are genuinely determined to prevent a war. The Soviet foreign policy statement of 17 April, elicited by the UN moves, served to indicate that at least for the time being the USSR shares this determination. This combination of events may lead the Arabs and Israelis to look more cautiously at their positions, even though it brings them no nearer to a settlement.

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## THE CYPRUS CRISIS

The execution on 10 May of two Greek Cypriots convicted of terrorist activities against the British has precipitated a new crisis for the Greek government at home and in its relations with Great Britain.

Widespread demonstrations began on Cyprus on 9 May, as soon as it was announced that clemency would not be granted. The British have clamped on the strictest security measures, and they have sufficient troops on

the island to control a general uprising. Repressive measures are unlikely, however, to diminish Greek-Cypriot determination to achieve union with Greece.

The Cypriot nationalist-terrorist organization, EOKA, may lose some prestige as a result of its failure to prevent the executions as it had repeatedly stated it would. However, unless the British can smash the organization, acts of terrorism will probably continue.

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Widespread demonstrations against the British have already occurred in Athens and Salonika; they are expected to increase in size and intensity. Action against American installations is likely since the United States is often considered to be supporting Britain. Greek police and army units are on an emergency footing, but the government will probably deem it necessary to continue to permit demonstrations. At the same time, it will face rising popular resentment if it takes the strong measures which may become necessary to keep the demonstrations orderly.

The Greek government, which appealed to the United States, the UN and the European Commission on the Rights of Man to prevent the execution, may feel

impelled to break diplomatic relations with Britain. Greek foreign minister Theotokis told the American embassy that he was convinced the British are determined to bring down the Karamanlis government and stated that Greece's "painfully achieved" moderate policy has been shattered.

The opposition is expected to resume its attacks on the government. Foreign Minister Theotokis, whose resignation was demanded by the opposition and by Cypriot nationalists for mishandling Athens' Cyprus policy, may be an early casualty. The Karamanlis government may find it impossible to remain in office. Its collapse would end any hope of a moderate Greek policy on the Cyprus issue in the foreseeable future.

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## PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

## PAKISTAN

Pakistani prime minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's two-week trip to Communist China, scheduled to begin 15 May, will coincide with an intense power struggle at home which will determine his political future. Opposition Awami League leader H. S. Suhrawardy, who may replace Chaudhri as prime minister, would not alter basically Pakistan's present ties with the West, but both President Mirza and the West would probably find Suhrawardy more independent than the prime ministers they have had to deal with in the past.

China Trip

Chaudhri plans to visit Peiping, Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, Shanghai and Canton. He will be accompanied by ten government officials, including the foreign minister, and 16 newsmen. The general composition of the group suggests that the trip is intended primarily as a well-publicized cultural tour, but the presence of the chairman of the Pakistan Development Corporation and the chief engineer of a large irrigation project in East Pakistan indicates that economic and technical matters may also be discussed.

The trip has already been widely publicized as a "warming up" of Pakistani relations with Communist China. This is increasing uncertainty in Southeast Asia concerning the unity of SEATO members against Communism, according to Ambassador Bishop at SEATO headquarters in Bangkok. It is doubtful, however, that Karachi sees the visit in this light. Instead, it probably intends it mainly

to counter Indian influence in Asia and to promote Pakistan as a more acceptable intermediary between the West and Communist China than India.

Power Struggle at Home

While the prime minister is in China, meetings of the provincial assemblies, scheduled for 19 May in West Pakistan and 22 May in East Pakistan, may result in a change in the country's leadership, although this may be delayed until autumn. Chaudhri appears the most likely



Prime Minister  
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali

casualty of such a change and opposition leader Suhrawardy the probable beneficiary.

Disgruntled old-line Moslem League leaders in West Pakistan have challenged the leadership of the prime minister and President Mirza. In East Pakistan, a combination of the Awami League opposition, Hindus, and dissident members of the ruling United Front Party, is also moving against Mirza and Chaudhri.

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If the opposing forces win on the provincial level, they will almost certainly unite to overthrow Mirza and Chaudhri when the national



Awami League Chief  
Hussein Shahid Suhrawardy

assembly meets in the fall. Rather than allow this, Mirza is likely to attempt to dictate new appointments which will maintain his influence both in the central and provincial government. He reportedly hopes to have a plan for such action completed by 15 May, the date of Chaudhri's departure for China.

Chaudhri's Possible Successor

H. S. Suhrawardy, leader of the Awami League, probably plays a large role in Mirza's plan. Mirza has shown increasing respect for Suhrawardy in recent months and would probably not be averse to having him replace Chaudhri, whom he recently described to the American ambassador in Karachi as "a bloody fool" for allowing

the present political struggle to begin.

Suhrawardy could withhold his support and hope that the opposition would overturn Mirza as well as Chaudhri, thus giving him a good chance to come out on top in the resultant free-for-all. However, the premiership has long been Suhrawardy's goal, and, if assured on this point, he would probably be willing to join in the effort to preserve Mirza's power.

Even if Suhrawardy should become prime minister, the powerful old-line Moslem League clique in West Pakistan would continue to make the position of the central leaders shaky. An alliance between Suhrawardy and Mirza, however, would



President Iskander Mirza

surmount the present crisis and give Mirza time to consolidate his position.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## SOUTH KOREAN ELECTION

The death of Democratic presidential candidate Sin Ik-hui (P.H. Shinicky) has removed from the election scene President Rhee's most outspoken critic, and has forced the Democrats to concentrate their efforts almost entirely on the vice-presidential race. Under South Korean law the Democratic Party cannot appoint another candidate to head its ticket in the election to take place on 15 May, and Rhee's only other opponent, ex-Communist Cho Pong-am, will be unacceptable to many of Sin's conservative followers.

While Sin's death from a cerebral hemorrhage deprives the Democrats of their most effective campaigner, his loss may stimulate a sympathy vote for his running mate, Chang Myon. Both Chang and his Liberal Party rival, Yi Ki-pung, are regarded as political moderates who are friendly toward the United States.

The vice-presidential race may be close, but informed observers generally believe that as a result of police suppression, Liberal Party majorities in rural areas will be sufficient to overcome opposition strength in the cities. Democratic leaders have stated that

they will concentrate on the vice-presidential race rather than actively support Cho Pong-am against Rhee. Democratic prospects have been somewhat improved by the withdrawal of the Progressive Party vice-presidential candidate, which in effect unites opposition forces behind Chang Myon.

It is likely that the Liberal Party will attempt to secure the withdrawal of independent pro-Rhee candidates for the vice presidency who might detract from the vote for President Rhee's running mate, Yi Ki-pung. Other eleventh-hour maneuvers may include Democratic attempts to obtain support from followers of Yi Pom-sok.

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Observers in Seoul note that pre-election tension is rising, and that Cho Pong-am, President Rhee's opponent, has gone into hiding. Army Forces Far East observes that opposition support for a "joint committee to ensure a fair election" reflects widespread distrust of the Liberal Party-dominated ballot-counting machinery.

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## NORTH AFRICA

The Tunisian and Moroccan governments have intensified their campaign for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with other countries. Both North African governments are particularly anxious to exchange ambassadors with the United States. Great Britain announced on 10 May its formal recognition and its intent shortly to exchange ambassadors.

Tunisia

On 3 May, Tunisian prime minister Habib Bourghiba emphasized to the American consul general the urgent need for an exchange of diplomats with Western states, not only to prove Tunisia's independent status but also to alleviate pressures from the followers of extremist nationalist Salah ben Youssef and from various Middle Eastern states. He stated that Jordan, Egypt and

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Turkey had announced their readiness to send diplomats to Tunisia. The Iraqi government announced on 3 May that it intended to open legations in both Tunis and Rabat.

**Morocco**

Moroccan foreign minister Balafrej was plainly angry when the American chargé in Tangier told him that the United States would not open an embassy until France had reached an agreement with Morocco as to the conduct of Moroccan foreign affairs. Balafrej has since attempted to bypass the French high commission in Rabat by dealing directly with the Dutch and Spanish consulates general. Spain requested Moroccan approval on 8 May of its nomination of Consul General Alcover as ambassador to Rabat. (Also see Part III, p. 5)

**French Position**

The French government maintains that it has sole responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs of its former protectorates pending parliamentary approval of a transfer. Nevertheless, Paris seems to be modifying its position somewhat with regard to Morocco. It may now advance its original timetable, which called for giving Morocco full responsibility for its foreign affairs only when all negotiations with France are completed, probably this fall. Some French officials anticipate

that an agreement on this issue may be reached shortly.

With regard to Tunisia, however, Paris has remained adamant and has accused Bourghiba of "double-dealing"--of professing to co-operate with France while working increasingly more closely with the Arab League and the Algerian rebels. Bourghiba would be seriously, if not permanently, alienated if Paris should permit Morocco to exchange diplomatic representatives while withholding this privilege from Tunisia.

**Tangier**

Meanwhile, nationalist leaders in Tangier are forcing the Moroccan government to take faster action than had been contemplated on the reintegration of Tangier into the Moroccan administration. Preparations are under way for the holding of an international conference of the eight nations represented on Tangier's International Committee of Control to annul or revise the current Tangier Statute. Spain and France, which recently scuttled an attempt to replace the unsatisfactory Belgian administrator with a Moroccan, are now vying with each other to champion the "re-Moroccanization" of the international zone of Tangier.

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**TITO'S VISIT TO FRANCE**

Marshal Tito's five-day state visit to France, which began on 7 May, is part of Yugoslavia's campaign to strengthen its political and economic ties with the West as a balance to its growing relations with the Soviet bloc. Tito insisted that

this trip precede his journey to Moscow, scheduled for June. Although the Paris visit is primarily social, Tito probably hopes for some economic accords. He has already presented Yugoslavia's views on international developments.

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For the last two years, the Yugoslavs have often held views, particularly on neutralist and coexistence themes, similar to those of some elements in France, and there have been recent contacts at high levels. A leader of the French Socialist Party's left wing, Daniel Mayer, visited Belgrade this April, and Pierre Mendes-France had discussions with all the top Yugoslav leaders last September when he went to Yugoslavia on a private visit.

The Yugoslavs will probably press their view that the present time calls for peaceful economic co-operation, a reduction of emphasis on military blocs, with stress on disarmament rather than a military build-up. They advocate public encouragement of the anti-Stalinist line of the present

Soviet regime. In addition, they advocate co-operation among all "Socialists."

The two most important areas for economic negotiations are a request for French financing of Yugoslav production of the French Mystere fighter plane, and the efforts of a private French group, with government help, to finance the Yugoslav Majdanpek copper mining complex.

While Tito will discuss French economic assistance for Yugoslavia, he probably considers that the principal value of his trip will be to strengthen his political position at home and abroad and further Yugoslavia's role as a bridge between East and West.

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## SOVIET-DANISH TALKS

The talks between Soviet and Danish leaders held in Moscow in March provided a clear picture of the attitude of the Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev, toward NATO. The main question under discussion was the Soviet demand for delivery of a tanker which Denmark felt obligated, under COCOM regulations, to refuse.

Khrushchev told the Danish delegation that, in fact, the Soviet Union did not need tankers. He argued that NATO, under American domination, was attempting to circumscribe the Soviet Union, that Denmark was acting as an agent of NATO, and that a Soviet agreement with Denmark not including tankers would be a sign of Soviet capitulation. The USSR, he said, was trying to establish friendly

relations with everyone, but would not buy this friendship with debasement.

Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet demand for a tanker was made strictly to undermine Western trade controls when he proposed, as a compromise, that the two countries sign an agreement for a tanker, but perhaps agree later not to carry it out. He emphasized that the tanker question was unimportant in itself, but had become a matter of principle.

Khrushchev admitted that the USSR was partly responsible for the cold-war conditions under which NATO was set up, and he expressed understanding of Danish motives for joining NATO at that time. He said, however, that he thought changed

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conditions made Danish-Soviet co-operation advisable, and several times he expressed confidence that NATO would soon collapse. It was for this reason, he added, that the USSR was interested in improving political relations with its neighbors, such as the Scandinavian countries. (Also see Part III, p. 9).

The negotiations revealed the working relationships of some of the Soviet leaders. Although Khrushchev dominated the proceedings, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Molotov freely contributed their views during the discussions. 25X1

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## NATO "WISE MEN" APPOINTED

Wide discussion in the recent North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting of the need for a new orientation of NATO led to the selection of three foreign ministers--Pearson of Canada, Martino of Italy, and Lange of Norway--to study ways of improving co-operation in nonmilitary fields and of developing greater unity.

This committee, already dubbed "the Three Wise Men," plans to meet in Paris in mid-June after canvassing all NATO members for suggestions. Pearson will visit Washington and London, Lange will cover Denmark and the Benelux countries, and Martino will see the southern NATO nations. They will talk with the French when they return to Paris. Pearson's tentative objective is to have a report ready for a possible NATO ministerial meeting in New York when the UN General Assembly meets in mid-November.

In appointing this committee, the Council reverted to a method found successful in 1951 when a special committee of economic planners--also called "the Three Wise Men," but drawn from the United States, Britain and France--was given the task of reconciling military requirements with the politico-economic capabilities of NATO countries. The make-up of the

present committee avoids the taint of Big Three domination, which the lesser powers have strongly opposed in the past.

The new committee has the task of reconciling divergent views on ways of meeting commonly recognized dangers to the Western alliance. The three ministers, like NATO as a whole, agree on the need for strengthening the unity of the alliance by somehow making it a forum for co-ordination of political and economic strategy, but they apparently lack agreement on specific solutions for extending political consultation and countering the new threat of the Soviet economic offensive.

Both Pearson and Lange have, for example, expressed themselves as strongly in favor of stimulating the habit of prior consultation on situations that might become critical, but neither has suggested any fixed procedure for accomplishing this. Pearson has urged that the authority of the permanent representatives of the North Atlantic Council be strengthened.

In the economic field, all three favor using existing organizations for any extended action by NATO, particularly in aiding underdeveloped areas. Only Martino has gone so far as to advocate creation of an

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advisory committee of high-level experts.

Early press reactions to the NATO meeting have been predominantly negative. British comment has expressed disappointment at the lack of a discernible transformation in NATO after the hopes engendered by various pre-meeting ministerial speeches

and interviews. The Netherlands press also has been uniformly skeptical about solid results, except for the appointment of the committee. The only official reaction so far has come from Belgian foreign minister Spaak, who expressed disappointment with the meeting. [REDACTED]

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#### POLISH OFFICIALS APOLOGIZE FOR LOW STANDARD OF LIVING

Polish officials, on the defensive in the face of widespread criticism, have been unusually frank in trying to explain the failure of their Six-Year Plan (1949-1955) to raise the standard of living.

In a speech given on 6 April, Edward Ochab, the new party first secretary, attributed the austerity of the past six years in Poland to "the growing tension in the international situation at that time ..., the weakening of democracy within the party and of the bonds with the masses, the insufficient concern for the development of initiative among the masses for a maximum effort aimed at solving acute grievances and removing shortcomings in the life of working people." He also blamed agricultural shortcomings and declared that a substantial rise in agricultural production would be necessary before any impressive improvement in the standard of living could be achieved.

Nearly all Polish reports on living standards emphasize the great effort that has gone into increasing military power. Great pride is taken in the production of tanks and radar in Poland, even though the writers admit that these

accomplishments deprived other industries of first-class engineers and technicians. According to Ochab, "from 1951 to 1953 the proportion of the investment and defense expenditure increased excessively, causing a serious strain on the national economy."

The regime admits that improvement in the living scale of most Poles has been slight, but contends that limited economic resources allow little improvement for those employed in less critical sectors of the economy.

In his speech on 6 April, Ochab observed that "there can be no doubt that there are still hundreds of thousands of families in Poland which have felt the improvement of their material situation only to a very small degree." A Polish broadcast two days later stated, "Official optimism in this sphere (standard of living) has cost the nation dearly.... Responsibility for the discrepancy which nevertheless exists between figures and facts falls in the past period when it was very fashionable to say half-truths, and half-truths often border on lying." The Polish government has promised wage increases this year, and

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has already expressed regret that the proposed raises will be so inadequate.

The apologetic attitude of the regime and the feebleness of the wage increases are likely to stimulate rather than allay general dissatisfaction with living standards. In any case, wage increases without

much larger supplies of consumer goods than now exist would merely be inflationary. Thus, genuine improvements in real wages would require a radical increase in agricultural production and a cutback in the rapid rate of heavy industrial development. Neither of these expedients is likely.

(Prepared by ORR)


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### RAIL CONSTRUCTION ON AMOY ISLAND

A high-priority rail construction effort is under way on Amoy Island, suggesting that Peiping may intend to reopen the island's port late this year. Full use of the port would require neutralization of

the Chinese Nationalist forces on nearby Quemoy Island.

The Chinese Communist construction effort on Amoy will extend the new trans-Fukien line from the mainland over



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two new causeways, 8,500 and 6,500 feet long, respectively, directly onto the island, past Kaochi airfield, and southward ten miles to the large commercial piers in Amoy city. This is a significant undertaking, requiring tunneling through the mountainous spine of the island and the conversion of areas adjacent to the port, now containing school and government buildings as well as residences, into a railway marshaling yard.

The priority given the construction effort on Amoy indicates that the work will be completed by the time the entire East China line opens to traffic. The Chinese Communists have previously stated they intend to reopen Amoy, the best port south of Shanghai, and the only port now closed to ocean shipping by the Nationalists, after the rail line is built. It is now believed they may intend to do so promptly, perhaps late this year or very early in 1957.

In the meantime, the Chinese Communists have continued their "crash" railroad construction program in Fukien Province. The Yingtan-Amoy

line is about one-third finished,

bed formation is being rushed to completion on the southern section, and that preliminary construction is under way on the 130-mile spur line to Foochow.

the entire railroad will be completed late in 1956, a year ahead of schedule.

The trans-Fukien railroad will serve a major purpose in substantially increasing Chinese Communist military capabilities in the East China area, although the railroad would not have to be extended onto Amoy Island to accomplish this. At least four important airfields in the immediate vicinity of Amoy will be provided with a direct and adequate POL supply via the new line, which will also permit the rapid movement of large stocks of military supplies. Capacity of the railroad will be about 4,000 to 5,000 tons each way per day, at least twice the existing capability of the overland road system.

(Prepared by ORR)

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## CHINESE NATIONALISTS ATTEMPT TO HARASS SOVIET SHIPPING

The Chinese Nationalists are attempting to harass Soviet shipping in the South China Sea area, where Soviet vessels have recently resumed voyages to North China and Soviet Far East ports.

The USSR abandoned direct shipments from Europe to North

Chinese ports in June 1954 following the seizure of the tanker Tuapse en route to Shanghai with a load of kerosene. Tanker shipments to Soviet Far East ports continued via a lengthy and circuitous route south of Sumatra and east of the Philippine Islands.


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## SOVIET SHIPPING ROUTES AND CHINESE NATIONALIST PATROLS

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Not until 8 March of this year did the USSR resume tanker shipments through the shorter and more economical South China Sea route close to Taiwan.

Shortly after the USSR returned to the shorter route, the Chinese Nationalists began unsuccessful attempts to harass this shipping.

When American officials protested against the augmented Nationalist patrols on 28 April, Minister of Defense Yu Ta-wei informed them that he would "exert his best influence to

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avoid any untoward incident." American officials were also informed by the Nationalists that patrols are under orders not to fire upon, stop, or board Soviet ships, but to maintain blinker contact with them, follow them, and "annoy them as much as possible." The halting of a Panamanian ore carrier by destroyer-escorts on 3 May after it had been mistakenly identified by a patrol plane as a Soviet tanker indicates, however, that Nationalist patrols are prepared to take stronger action.

Chiang Kai-shek may believe that the risk involved in

seizure of another Soviet ship would be offset by the burden placed on Soviet shipping resulting from denial of the South China Sea route.

Approximately ten additional tanker voyages a year would be needed to make good the annual loss of 100,000 tons of POL for the Soviet Far East and Communist China caused by the need to take the longer route around the Philippines. Chiang may also calculate that seizure or harassment of Soviet shipping would boost morale on Taiwan and among the Overseas Chinese.   
(Prepared jointly with ORR)

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RAPID PROGRESS  
ON TRANS-SINKIANG RAILROAD

China and the USSR have now set 1960 as the deadline for completion of the Trans-Sinkiang railway providing the bloc with a transcontinental railway in addition to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The agreements reached when Mikoyan visited Peiping early in April establish the route through the difficult terrain along the Sino-Soviet border and call for Soviet participation in building the section between the border and Urumchi in Sinkiang. The new line may be completed a year ahead of this new schedule.

After exploring at least four alternate border routes for the strategic line, the Russians and Chinese determined earlier this year that the most practical alignment would be via the Dzhungarian Gate in the vicinity of Lake Ebi Nor. Apparently adverse weather conditions in this area, involving winds of tremendous velocity,

did not present as formidable an obstacle as the rugged terrain on the edge of the Ili River basin. The chosen route will be some 520 miles in length, extending from Aktogay station on the Soviet Turk-Sib Railway to Urumchi in Sinkiang.

The USSR has announced that the line is to be open to through traffic by 1960, a year ahead of the original schedule established in October 1954. The Soviet Turk-Sib Transport Construction Trust is already engaged in preliminary construction and intends to open the 190-mile portion of the line on Soviet soil in 1958. On the other end, the Chinese Ministry of Railway's First and Fourth Engineering Bureaus intend to reach Hami, Sinkiang, in 1957.

The Chinese organizations have nearly doubled their rate of construction, with four major plan revisions last year alone, and are now one full year ahead


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### Trans-Sinkiang Railroad



of the original construction schedule. At the present rate, and with the most difficult terrain behind them, it seems more than likely that they can fulfill their revised plan for 1956 and 1957, and reach Urumchi in late 1958 or early 1959. This would permit them to better the new construction plan by one year.

Diesel operation is planned for the Aktoqay-Soviet border sector and may be intended for the entire railway. This would overcome the difficulty of an

inadequate water supply for steam locomotives in the essentially desert terrain through which the line passes, and would make possible a high cargo-carrying capacity.

The Chinese would be unlikely to permit the extension of the Soviet broad-gauge rail system any farther east than Urumchi. A logical location for the change-of-gauge point would be at Wusu, where an important oil field could supply diesel fuel.

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### VIET MINH PARTY CONFERENCE

The ninth enlarged conference of the central committee of the Viet Minh Communists, which met from 19 to 24 April, endorsed the Soviet 20th Party Congress position on collective leadership and renewed demands for the "peaceful" unification of the two Vietnams. On both

questions, however, the party leaders apparently retain certain reservations: they continue their adulatory references to Ho Chi Minh and acknowledge the existence of some party sentiment in favor of unification through armed struggle.

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Ho's Position Secure

While endorsing the principle of collective leadership, the Viet Minh implied that it itself had not been guilty of serious violations. Ho Chi Minh conceded that the Viet Minh was guilty "to a certain degree," but affirmed that this had not produced "any serious consequence."

In any case, it is clear the Viet Minh intends to continue its special veneration of Ho Chi Minh. In describing the May Day appearance of Ho, Hanoi radio observed, "the whole forest of flags and flowers reverberated with loud and prolonged applause as President Ho Chi Minh, beloved leader of the Vietnamese people, appeared smiling at the central rostrum." The May Day slogans ended with the motto "Long Live Ho Chi Minh." A high Viet Minh official told [redacted] last February that Stalin was a dictator whereas Ho is beloved by all people and that the Viet Minh does not intend to downgrade Ho.

During the long struggle against the French, Ho became something of a legend among all Vietnamese. The Communists may feel that any lessening of Ho's prestige would injure Hanoi's appeal to Vietnamese nationalism. To downgrade Ho in the face of the growing stature of President

Diem in the south would deprive North Vietnam of its greatest nationalist symbol during its campaign for the unification of the two Vietnams.

Peaceful Unification

In harmony with the Soviet 20th Party Congress endorsement of "peaceful" means of seizing power, Viet Minh speakers at the party conference renewed pleas for the peaceful unification of North and South Vietnam. The conference discussions, however, suggest that party sentiment is far from unanimous on the need for conformity with international Communist strategy on this question. Party secretary Truong Chinh acknowledged that "some people" hold the policy of peaceful unification to be "illusory and reformist."

Militant feeling among the Viet Minh Communists may have been strengthened by the emergence of a viable South Vietnam during the past year and the reduced prospect of unification elections in the near future. Ho Chi Minh observed at the congress that "the enemies of our people still occupy one half of our national territory and are preparing for war..." and, while endorsing peaceful unification, affirmed the need to "be in a position to change the form of the struggle." [redacted]

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COMMUNISTS INCREASE STRENGTH  
IN BURMESE ELECTIONS

Although Premier Nu's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League retained a substantial lower house majority in the 27 April elections, the Communist-led National Front made

significant gains. To date, the government coalition has won 155 seats, the Front 45, the rightist Burma Nationalist Bloc 1, and various independents 10. Elections in twelve

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constituencies were postponed for 90 days, ostensibly because of poor security conditions, and 27 constituencies have not yet reported.

Communist Gains

The Communists have increased their representation by at least 32 seats. This was accomplished in the face of extensive government efforts to manipulate the elections. Although the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League has retained firm control of the legislature, the Communists now have a solid bloc of deputies who will use every opportunity to harass the government in the lower house of parliament, from which the government derives its powers.

The Communists' strong showing appears to have taken the government party by surprise. Nu himself attempted to explain away their success with dark hints of "voter intimidation" by the Front's underground Communist allies. He intimated that the government was considering postponement of the 22 May elections for the relatively unimportant upper house, if its suspicions that some of the electorate voted under duress are confirmed. In making these allegations, the premier may also have been laying the groundwork for attempts to challenge the credentials of Communist victors in the lower house elections.

There may have been insurgent interference in some of

the more remote rural constituencies, but the Communists made their best showing in urban areas where security conditions are good. Far more important causes of the Front's gains include its ability to attract the large protest vote and the popularity of its call during the campaign for a negotiated settlement of the "civil war."

Government Reaction

The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, which has always felt more insecure than its strong parliamentary position would seem to warrant, will probably try to placate the extreme left-wing sentiment reflected in the elections. Certain of its leaders are already looking with apprehension toward the 1961 elections, and fears have been expressed that this might be the last election the League could win. Under the circumstances, the prospects are that the government will take such steps as it considers necessary either to neutralize or to absorb the pro-Communist opposition.

Its first action may well be to soften the terms under which the insurgent Burma Communist Party will be permitted to re-emerge as a legal political party. Pressure may also develop within the League for another attempt at "leftist unity," as was done in 1948 shortly after the Communists went underground.

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COMMUNISTS EMPHASIZE  
INTERNATIONAL YOUTH ACTIVITY

In line with Soviet foreign policy objectives, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS),

two Communist youth fronts, are trying to establish better working relations with non-Communist groups. They are arranging festivals, conferences, tours, summer camps and student exchanges.

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As its objectives for 1956-57, the WFDY will attempt to strengthen ties with youth and student groups in non-Communist countries, strengthen women's organizations and prepare for its international youth and student festival for 30,000 to be held in Moscow in the summer of 1957. As a means of making contacts, the WFDY hopes to use the non-Communist World Assembly of Youth, the International Union of Socialist Youth, the YMCA and the YWCA. Approaches will also be made to major Protestant, Catholic and Moslem organizations.

Scandinavia clearly has been singled out for special attention. Communist-sponsored activities have been arranged with Danish and Finnish youth, and Soviet and WFDY officials have asked Norwegian officials to promote Norwegian interest in WFDY-IUS regional and international sports activities. The latter program probably will have considerable propaganda appeal since sporting events involving Soviet and Satellite teams have been very lucrative and popular in Norway and other small European countries.

This summer the WFDY and the IUS plan to hold a meeting of 300 young women in Paris, a meeting of 1,600 youths from the Baltic area in East Germany, an international sports meeting for 3,000 in Bologna, and the Fourth World Student Congress in Prague. A preliminary meeting of world youth will be held in Moscow in August to prepare for the 1957 festival. A high-level WFDY delegation will reportedly visit Latin America in June, presumably to stimulate interest in the 1957 festival.

The WFDY and the IUS are also engaged in preparations for the Afro-Asian Students' Conference to be held in Bandung late this month. Although the Indonesian national preparatory council is now firmly non-Communist, American observers report that Communist delegates may well get control of the meeting. The leader of the Burmese delegation is a well-trained Communist, having spent many years in Prague. He is an IUS official and a well-known figure at international Communist-front meetings.

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#### USSR PRODUCING SUBMINIATURE ELECTRONIC PARTS

The Soviet electronics industry is now able to mass-produce subminiature tubes, and production of transistors may have passed the experimental stage. Recent Soviet periodicals

have published information on the characteristics and applications of nine types of subminiature tubes and 15 types of transistors. An analysis of sample tubes and

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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data on Soviet tube plants indicates that the new tubes are comparable in quality to corresponding American tubes and that they are now being produced in quantity. Sample transistors are not available, but Soviet technical literature suggests that production has passed the experimental stage.

Subminiature tubes were probably first produced by the USSR in experimental quantities in 1950 or 1951. The United States mass-produced them,

especially for use in proximity fuses, during World War II. Transistors, which were produced in the United States in 1952, were probably not produced in the Soviet Union before 1955.

Subminiature electronic components are used in a wide variety of military and civilian electrical devices. They are essential for proximity fuses, guided missiles, and modern air-borne electronic equipment. [REDACTED]

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## INTEGRATION OF AGRICULTURAL PLANS IN USSR AND SATELLITES

Soviet and Satellite agricultural conferences held this year have set a pattern for improving the co-ordination of Soviet bloc agricultural plans. Agriculture is the weakest aspect of the bloc economies, and the USSR is beginning to push increased specialization in the output of crops and production of agricultural machinery.

In January, V. V. Mat-skevich, the Soviet minister of agriculture, chaired a meeting in Warsaw of all Satellite agricultural ministers at which each participant reported on the current agricultural situation in his country. The ministers then discussed the problems of furthering agricultural socialization in the Satellites, setting up bloc-wide agricultural plans for the next five years, and planning further specialization among the Satellite agricultural economies.

Follow-up conferences under the auspices of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance and involving lower officials met in Moscow intermittently during

February and March, and were divided into working groups for specific problems, such as mechanization, livestock, state reserves, fertilizers, and trade.

The mechanization group made certain recommendations for each member country, and called for a special commission to convene in November 1956 to determine the final quantities of basic agricultural machinery to be imported or produced by each country. A list was drawn up of various types of agricultural machinery which could not be exported to the capitalist countries because of anticipated bloc deficiencies.

The working-level conferences in Moscow also agreed that beginning in May 1956 an exchange system with headquarters in Moscow would be set up to take care of individual Satellite needs for various agricultural experts and specialists.

Differences of opinion were reportedly expressed quite openly in the general discussions at the conference. The

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Rumanian delegation rather vigorously opposed the importation by Rumania of Soviet corn-harvesting combines. Poland was criticized by the Soviet representative for planning to collectivize only 23 percent of its agriculture by 1960. Hungary was also criticized by the Soviet representative for inefficient use of mechanized agricultural methods.

Despite this freedom of discussion, the predominant role of the Soviet representatives was felt throughout the conference. By the end of the conference, Soviet "advice" had been generally accepted on all issues.

In the field of industrial production, economic integration of the East European Satellites has proceeded at an increasing pace since 1949. Considerable progress in the specialization of production and division of labor has already been achieved. In agriculture, present information suggests that each Satellite will largely continue to develop its own over-all agriculture program but, in addition, will begin to specialize in the production of certain agricultural commodities and machinery.

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## ISSUE OF AUSTRIAN TERRITORIAL GUARANTEE MAY BE REVIVED

Recent developments in Vienna and Moscow indicate that the difficult question of a four-power guarantee of Austrian territorial integrity and inviolability may soon be revived. Soviet officials have thus far kept silent on the issue, but Vienna's attitude suggests that the Austrians may not require Russian prod- ding to bring up the matter on their own initiative.

Under the terms of the "Moscow memorandum" resulting from Chancellor Raab's negotiations with Molotov in April 1955, the Austrian government undertook "to seek to obtain" such a guarantee from Britain, France and the United States, and the USSR stated it was "prepared to participate" in it. This offer seems to have been freely made by the Austrians themselves and was intended to meet earlier vague Soviet demands for some type of guarantee against the possibility of

another Austro-German Anschluss. The Soviet leaders were not much taken with the idea at the time, however, and they have shown virtually no interest in it since.

Evidence that Moscow may now consider the commitment a live issue was contained in a Pravda article of 16 April which rebuked Austria for joining the Council of Europe and stated that since the four powers had agreed in principle to the guarantee, it was high time the agreement was carried out. When Austria's ambassador in Moscow sought an official explanation of this article, Soviet deputy foreign minister Semenov denied that he was aware of any intention to raise the question. American ambassador Thompson in Vienna believes, however, that the Austrians still expect the USSR to broach the matter with them after the Austrian national elections on 13 May.

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Austrian Arguments

Austrian officials have repeatedly pressed the Western powers to work out a common position on the matter, but no longer stress the Anschluss danger. They now emphasize Austria's position as a small country on the "front line," unprotected by alliances, and the value the guarantee would have as psychological support for the establishment of the Austrian army.

More recently, State Secretary Kreisky has emphasized the danger from the East and has suggested that a "real guarantee" would make Austria in effect a "member" of NATO.

Western Objections

Discussions among the Western Big Three have taken the line that the objections to the guarantee idea greatly outweigh the merits the Austrians

see in it. Aside from the constitutional problems involved, there is the fear that such a commitment would put too much stress on Austrian neutrality, would appear directed at West Germany, and might restore to the USSR prerogatives for supervising Austrian affairs and even for intervening.

Since none of the Big Four borders Austria, an effective guarantee would require the participation of Austria's neighbors. Moreover, Austria already has a strong "guarantee" in the UN charter and the state treaty, and a new but weak commitment might give the Austrians the impression that the West is less interested in their fate than is actually the case.

How much effect these arguments will have on the Austrians remains to be seen; they will probably have little effect if Moscow itself takes the initiative.

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FRANCO'S REACTION  
TO UNREST IN SPAIN

Unrest among Spanish industrial workers continues. General Franco's recent speeches to the Falange suggest to the American embassy in Madrid that he now feels on the defensive and is trying to counteract the increasing discontent within the country by "lashing out intemperately."

The most vocal indication of unrest recently has come from the workers in northern Spain who defied the legal ban on strikes to protest the inadequacy of the government's wage increase of 1 April. In Bilbao, where the walkouts were

most protracted, a major complaint by the workers was that they could make ends meet only by continued overtime. Although strikes in the north are reported now virtually over, the American consul general in Seville in the South reported on 5 May that there was considerable unrest in the factories there and that walkouts might ensue.

Franco's present tactics conform to his usual strategy of playing off one faction against another. In an obvious effort to allay labor unrest, Franco declared in a 24 April

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speech to the copper miners in southern Spain that the workers would share in profits and that wages would be revised "as many times as may be found necessary."

In an address made to the Falange on the same day, he said that the party would rise again if necessary to prevent widespread disorders--a statement designed mainly to bolster the party's sagging morale. He has failed, however, to offer the Falange concrete assurances about its future other than to say that the party would remain the main political

component under a monarchal regime in the future.

The army, which has long been the principal prop of Franco's power, was referred to in one of his recent speeches as the backbone of domestic peace, and has since received a sop in the form of a pay-raise proposal now up for legislative approval. Nevertheless, both the army and the Monarchists are reported by the American embassy to have been displeased by Franco's "truculent" profession of Falangist faith.

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## PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

## PROBLEM YOUTH IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Communists for 30-odd years have striven to create a generation made up of the "new Soviet man"--wholeheartedly devoted to Communist morality and the party line and indoctrinated in political and social conformity.

The Soviet regime is still struggling, however, evidently in vain, to suppress juvenile crime and what amounts to a minor cultural rebellion against official norms of public conduct, work discipline and cultural taste. Many Soviet youth--particularly the children of privileged parents--are displaying what the Communists consider an indecent, almost subversive, interest in lavish living, the conspicuous enjoyment of private property, idleness, Western dress, jazz and non-Communist literature.

Extent of Problem

The Soviet Union publishes no statistics on juvenile delinquency, but there is every indication that it is widespread and has been on the rise since the war. The problem was the subject of a secret circular sent out by the all-Union Komsomol central committee--the youth auxiliary of the Communist Party--to all local Komsomol committees last fall. The circular complained that instances of crime, drunken-

ness and addiction to religion and Western fashions were on the increase among Komsomol members, as well as among the youth at large.

Juvenile crime is most frequently encountered among underprivileged children, particularly those recruited for industrial work away from home and among the children of the upper bureaucracy. It is especially in the latter group that open flaunting of Soviet values and mores occurs.

Juvenile Delinquency

Khuligany: Juvenile delinquents, or khuligany (hooligans) as they are known in the Soviet Union, pose a real problem for the regime. The term hooliganism is used to cover a wide range of offenses, from swearing and rudeness to drunken brawling, theft and even murder and rape. Soviet press accounts and information from Western travelers describe sections of almost every town and city as terrorized by hooligan bands.

Stilyagi: The regime is also concerned with youth who in various ways demonstrate a rebellion against or rejection of Soviet standards. The most publicized and extreme type are the so-called stilyagi (stylists)--youths who imitate the more extreme Western fashions



STILYAGI (from KROKODIL)

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Stilyagi are purposely included in the heading khuligany by the Soviet regime, but though they often do run afoul of the law, there is a distinct difference. The offense of the khuligany is a conventional crime; that of the stilyagi approaches subversion.

Stilyagi are marked by flashy clothes. The boy stilyagi wears narrow green trousers, a bright yellow jacket, and thick crepe-soled shoes. The female equivalent wears stockings with black heels, carries a purse similar to a suitcase of large proportions, and has a great affinity for wearing large safety pins. One stilyagi is quoted as admitting that his long "Tarzan" haircut interfered with his work, but he had solved the problem by wearing a circle of wire around his head.

Most stilyagi are jazz fans and spend much time tracking down illegal recordings. Dance fads come and go; there was the "Hamburg" style and now the "Canadian." Stilyagi language is liberally sprinkled with foreign and even Latin expressions, and place names are frequently referred to by their prerevolutionary names or by foreign equivalents. Sverdlovsk, for instance, is called Yekaterinburg and Moscow's Gorky Street, Broadway. Their theme song has anti-Soviet lyrics sung to the tune of the Saint Louis Blues. One of their worst offenses from the regime's point of view is that they apparently do no work but spend their days "killing time," loafing on the streets, or drinking in bars.

Upper-class Children

A striking aspect of post-war juvenile delinquency in the

USSR has been not its prevalence among factory youth but its widespread appearance among the children of the privileged. It is among this group that the failure to indoctrinate youth with the desired ethics of love of work and subordination of the individual to socialist goals has been most marked.

There appears to be a definite tendency on the part of a considerable number of children of the upper strata to behave in a manner similar to the more degenerate elements of the prerevolutionary aristocracy. From this group come

## UPON GRADUATION



"I am not refusing to go to work in the North. You could send me to the North Caucasus."

(from KROKODIL)

the stilyagi, many of the hooligans, and a great number of professional dilettantes. Khrushchev's recent criticism of high school graduates who refused to "dirty their hands" doing manual labor was probably directed mainly at these youths. This problem was illustrated in the recent statement of a Georgian official that out of the 953 graduates in 1955 of the state university, 693 did not show up at their assigned place of work.

"Gilded Youth" and "Jet Set": The large group of dilettantes whose families' wealth or influence enables them to

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live in idleness and devote themselves to pursuit of personal pleasure is referred to in the Soviet Union as "gilded youth." Above this upper middle-class set is a much more exclusive group of dilettantes, children of Moscow's "400," whom Westerners have termed the "jet set."

To a less exaggerated degree the attitudes and mode of living of this "platinum youth" are also characteristic of social echelons among the "gilded youth." All members of the "jet set" are children of prominent Soviet officials, including the sons of Mikoyan and Kaganovich. One of the out-

be sent to jobs away from Moscow. They have almost no contact with people outside their circle and refer to the rest of the population scornfully as "the broad masses." While they apparently are completely loyal to the regime since it provides them with material well-being, they have no interest in or understanding of Communist doctrine.

Underlying Causes

The underlying causes for this delinquency in some cases are no different from those encountered in the West--poverty, broken homes and maladjustment.



(from KROKODIL)



Once upon a time he grabbed on to his father's neck....

....and he still hasn't gotten off.

standing features of this group is its members' apparently limitless supply of money. Their only problem is finding things to buy with it. They live lavishly, one young man being the proud owner of several dachas and five cars. Considerable time is spent attempting to acquire coveted foreign goods through semi-illegal channels.

A great many of the jet set do not work, preferring to live off their families rather than

There are however, other contributing factors which are more exaggerated in the USSR or are peculiar only to Soviet society.

The extreme conformist character of Soviet standards and the disregard for the individual undoubtedly cause many youths to rebel merely for the sake of asserting their own identity. Furthermore, the obvious conflict between the regime's claims and its actions

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for over 20 years cannot but have produced cynicism and dissillusionment.

The present anti-Stalin campaign may aggravate this situation. Many heretofore well-indoctrinated youth who have been brought up to idolize Stalin may now react by becoming cynical of Soviet society.

In the lower levels of society, economic conditions are a major factor causing delinquency. Most khuligany are industrial workers and labor school recruits, many of whom are cut off from their families at the age of 14 and sometimes earlier. Life is, to Western eyes, unbelievably drab, living conditions are miserable, and any sort of official supervision or concern negligible.

In the higher income groups, parental indulgence appears to be one of the main causes of delinquency. This perhaps stems from a desire on the part of successful Soviet officials to give their children all the things they themselves once lacked. With both parents working, which is frequently the case even in the most prominent Soviet families, little time is left for supervision of the children. If they get into trouble, they can be confident that their well-placed parents will get them off, whether the crime involves a broken window or a murder.

Regime's Campaign

Not long after the death of Stalin, the regime launched an extensive propaganda campaign aimed at raising the moral standards of youth. The propaganda consisted of lectures on the desired characteristics of Soviet youth and sensational exposés of various instances

of antisocial behavior. Attempts have been made to deter crime by publicizing court cases. There have been several show trials, where extremely severe sentences were meted out for relatively minor offenses. In the case of the nonconformists, ridicule is the primary weapon employed.

The propaganda campaign has been accompanied by various administrative measures, such as the organization of Komsomol brigades throughout the country. These brigades act as a sort of junior arm of the militia, patrolling dangerous sections of towns, and in general attempt to bring their unruly brothers into line. There is also evidence that the sections of the criminal code dealing with hooliganism are to be revised and strengthened to facilitate further prosecution of offenders.

A measure apparently designed in part to counter apathy and degeneracy among young members of the upper levels of Soviet society is a plan to establish a small number of boarding schools, described by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress. They will be extremely exclusive, situated in scenic surroundings and equipped with the best facilities and teachers. They will provide more discipline than the children receive at home, and will attempt to imbue the students with the desired socialist ethics.

The regime may eventually curb delinquency by ameliorating economic conditions, where these factors are the principal cause. It is doubtful, however, that ideology and propaganda, on which the regime principally relies in its campaign, will prove really effective.

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## WARSAW PACT DEVELOPMENTS

Since 14 May 1955, when high-level representatives of the Soviet bloc countries agreed to a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance and the creation of a joint command, the groundwork has been laid for more effective integration of the bloc's military forces. The principal measures thus far reported to have been effected under this arrangement--the Warsaw pact--include the addition of East Germany, commitments of some national forces to a combined defense force, joint training and co-ordinated weapons production...

Expansion of the Pact


The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw pact, meeting in Prague last January, formally enrolled East Germany into the unified command as a full military partner. The new

East German defense minister was made one of the deputy commanders of the combined defense establishment, and provisions were made for inclusion of East German contingents of troops. The committee also created a standing group to draft "recommendations on questions of foreign policy" and a joint secretariat headed by the USSR's General Antonov. The Political Consultative Committee is to meet semiannually.

Assignment of Forces

Six of the 14 Czechoslovak army divisions are reported to have been placed under the direct command of the unified headquarters in Moscow, headed by Marshal Konev. Since the Warsaw pact specifically provides for such action, it may be assumed that other Satellites have taken or will take similar steps.

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**Warsaw Pact Countries**Armament Production

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The replacement of World War II equipment in the Satellite armies is long overdue; and if these forces are to continue following the pattern of the

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Soviet army, co-ordinated production in some form to facilitate the standardization of weapons seems inevitable.

Combined Training

In April, Czech and possibly Polish troops were observed in East Germany, providing the clearest evidence to date of combined East European ground forces training. Little is known of Satellite naval integration under the Warsaw pact.

Soviet Control

Continued Soviet control of the Satellite defense establishments is certain. The degree of control exercised by the Satellite representatives on the Political Consultative Committee probably is minimal. Through Marshal Konev as commander in chief and General

Antonov as secretary general, the Soviet Defense Ministry has control over policy of the combined command. The chief Satellite representatives on Konev's staff are deputy commanders.

It is believed, also, that in each Satellite capital there is a liaison office. In some cases these may be headed by the former senior Soviet military attachés, who have relinquished their posts but remain in the countries in some unspecified capacity. These officers presumably serve as a channel for transmitting Moscow's military directives to the Satellites.

While the principal value to Moscow of the Warsaw pact remains political, further measures may be anticipated to make the combined command an effective combat force.

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## SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SCANDINAVIA

"Let friendly relations strengthen and develop between the Soviet Union and Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland!"-- a 1956 addition to the Soviet May Day slogans.

Soviet Objectives

The primary Soviet objective in Scandinavia since 1949 has been to weaken the ties of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland to NATO. At the least, the USSR would like to eliminate the

American base in Iceland and obtain firm commitments from Norway and Denmark that they will not permit foreign troops to be stationed on their territory in peacetime. It would also like to persuade these countries that world conditions now permit them to reduce their defense establishments and would like to gain Scandinavian support for the Soviet position on European security.

Moscow has tried unsuccessfully to use Sweden as an

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intermediary in this effort and has sought to encourage the formation of a neutral bloc around Sweden.

The Soviet objectives are essentially the same as when Norway, Denmark and Iceland first joined NATO, but the tactics are now based on conciliation rather than threats. Moscow is making particular efforts to impress the Scandinavians favorably through suggestions of party contacts with Socialists, exchanges of visits, and a variety of minor concessions.

Anti-NATO Drive

During the visits of the Norwegian and Danish prime ministers to Moscow last November and in March, the Soviet leaders sought commitments that foreign troops would not be stationed in their countries. The Danish prime minister refused, while the Norwegian leader agreed only to reiterate in the communiqué Norway's 1949 assurance to the Soviet Union that it would accept foreign troops and bases only in case of attack or threat of attack.

In talking to the Norwegian delegation, the Soviet leaders admitted past mistakes had given Norway reason to fear Soviet domination, but they argued that there was no reason for such fear now and that Norway could therefore leave NATO. The Soviet leaders told Norwegian premier Gerhardsen that the USSR would be willing to withdraw its forces as far away from the frontier in the north as was desired, and to accept control posts on both sides of the border. They said this would ensure Norwegian and Swedish security, and suggested that it might set a precedent for similar controls over troops at other points in Europe.

In talks with Swedish prime minister Erlander in Moscow in

April, the Soviet leaders made it clear that they hoped Sweden would influence Norway and Denmark to follow a neutral course, but they dropped the subject when Erlander refused to consider it. In drafting the final communiqué, the Russians suggested a statement that the USSR "supports" Sweden's "neutrality" policy, but agreed to the Swedish terminology that the USSR "respects" Sweden's policy of "freedom from alliances."

Soviet first deputy minister Gromyko, in a speech on 7 April to a Danish student group, strongly urged upon all the Scandinavian countries the neutrality policy followed by Sweden. Furthermore he repeated, with special reference to Scandinavia, the Soviet offer to join with other great powers in guarantees for neutral states as was proposed in the case of Austria.

The Icelandic leaders have not visited Moscow, and there has been no direct Soviet pressure on Iceland to get rid of the American base there. The main reliance has been on the propaganda activities of the Icelandic Communist Party, supported by a Soviet trade and cultural offensive. Moscow propaganda organs have not restrained their glee over the events there which threaten the American base.

Party and Cultural Contacts

In Norway, Denmark and Sweden, the Social Democrats are either the dominant party or the only party in the government. In recent months, Moscow has been seeking contacts with Social Democrats throughout Western Europe, but suggestions made by Soviet officials to the Norwegian and Danish prime ministers for contacts between the Soviet Communist Party and Norwegian and Danish Social Democrats were turned down. Moscow apparently

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has not yet suggested party contacts to the Swedish Social Democrats.

The exchange of delegations, which has been used so effectively as part of Moscow's conciliation campaign, has been particularly evident in Scandinavia. In 1955 the USSR exchanged 142 delegations with Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Sweden; almost half involved Sweden. There have been an even larger number of exchanges between Scandinavia and the Satellites. Exchanges include a number of parliamentary delegations, as well as naval visits scheduled this summer with Norway, Denmark and Sweden. The Soviet leaders have been invited to tour Scandinavia, and are likely to accept.

#### Trade and Other Concessions

Trade has played a moderately important role in the Soviet friendship effort in Scandinavia. The Danish prime minister's Moscow visit led to a compromise on the type of ships Denmark would export to the USSR, paving the way for negotiations to break the two-year deadlock in formal trade relations. Last November Norway signed a three-year trade agreement. Trade has played a key role in Soviet relations with Iceland, with the USSR becoming Iceland's chief market since formal trade relations were renewed in August 1953.

Agreements were signed at the end of March between the USSR and Sweden, Denmark and Norway providing for flights by the Soviet airline and the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) between Stockholm, Copenhagen and Moscow. Since Moscow has concluded such agreements so far with only a few non-Orbit states, this step indicates the relatively high priority Scandinavia has in the Soviet conciliatory campaign. During the visits of the various

prime ministers to Moscow, the USSR made a few minor concessions on such questions as the right of Swedish and Danish citizens to leave the USSR, negotiations on Swedish financial claims in the Baltic states, and negotiation of a sea rescue agreement with Norway.

#### Scandinavian Reaction

Thus far, these Soviet tactics appear to have had little direct influence on the foreign and defense policies of the Scandinavian countries. The general public as well as government and Social Democratic leaders are inclined to regard the Soviet Union as posing less of a threat today than in the past, but remain highly suspicious of Soviet aims in the absence of any real understanding between the East and the West. Given a further relaxation of international tension and the continued friendly behavior of the USSR and Soviet officials, increasing public pressure for a curtailment of military expenditures can be expected.

The Scandinavian press has said that until there is a real change in the behavior of the Russians, the professions of the new regime in the USSR have little meaning. The Scandinavian Social Democratic leaders, however, have certain misgivings about the ultimate effect of the Soviet "new look" on public opinion in Scandinavia.

The Swedish Communist Party is expected to improve its position somewhat in the September parliamentary election. Likewise, some Communist gains are anticipated in the Scandinavian trade unions. In both cases, however, the Communists will continue to be a small minority without significant influence.

The most striking development has been the decision of

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the Icelandic parliament on 28 March to request a revision of the Defense Agreement of 1951 between the United States and Iceland under which the United States is constructing and manning the NATO air base and ancillary operations at Keflavik. Undoubtedly the Soviet new look has convinced

a number of Icelanders that world conditions warrant a curtailment of American military activity on the island. The foreign minister himself has pointed to the relaxation of international tension as justifying Iceland's move, although he claims Iceland still loyally supports the concept of NATO.

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